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ARGUMENT
I.
WHEN VIEWING THE FACTS IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE
TO THE PLAINTIFF, A VALID ORAL ASSIGNMENT EXISTED
PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT
In the appellee's brief, the Defendants improperly assert that there was
sufficient evidence for the trial court to hold that there was not a valid assignment
prior to the filing of the Complaint. In particular, the Defendants allege that the
written assignment entered into between Mr. LeRoy Townsend and Mr. Steven C.
Davis was "meant to assign a future interest and not to ratify a previous verbal
agreement." [Appellee Brief page 7]. However, this argument fails to account for the
fact that a valid oral assignment did exist prior to reducing the assignment to writing.
The failure of the written assignment to make reference to the verbal assignment
does not invalidate the oral assignment already in place. 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments
§82 (1963) states in pertinent part as follows:
Even though the assignment is in writing the contract of the parties
need not fully appear in writing, but may be shown by evidence
alinude; that is the intent to assign may appear from the writing itself,
or it may be shown alinude.
In this matter, the record establishes that Plaintiff entered into a verbal
assignment with LeRoy Townsend and a Complaint was was filed on August 13,
1993 pursuant to that verbal assignment between the parties. [R. at 1-7]. The
assignment was later reduced to writing on August 30, 1993 and ratified by the
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Plaintiff on August 31, 1993. [R. at 363-365].
The Affidavit of the Plaintiff, Steven C. Davis, states in part:
2.

Before August 13, 1993, I was present with attorney Richard C.
Coxson when LeRoy Townsend retained the legal services of
Richard C. Coxson via telephone conversations. The terms
and conditions were verbally agreed to between all parties
before August 13, 1993. [emphasis added]. [R. at 407].

Whereas, the Affidavit of Richard C. Coxson states in part:
1.

I was originally retained in this matter by LeRoy W. Townsend
and by Steven C. Davis to represent them and received a
retainer fee paid by Mr. Townsend. I was aware of the
agreement and assignment between Mr. Townsend... [R. 361;
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at
Exhibit 18].

Even though the Affidavits of Plaintiff and Richard C. Coxson do not
make specific reference to a verbal assignment, the conduct of the parties in this
matter unequivocally demonstrates that there was a verbal assignment.

After the

telephone conversation specifically referenced in the Affidavit of Plaintiff, the
attorney, Richard C. Coxson, who was a party to the telephone conference prepared
and filed the Complaint naming the Plaintiff as the "party in interest" based upon the
verbal assignment between the Plaintiff and LeRoy Townsend. [R. at 1-7].
It is quite evident that when the facts are viewed in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiff, that the Affidavits of Steven C. Davis and Richard C.
Coxson can be interpreted to provide that a verbal assignment existed prior to the
filing of the Complaint. The trial court is required to view the evidence and every
logical inference must be drawn in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Martin v.
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Stevens, 243 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah). Therefore, the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's
action is obviously improper and should be overturned by this Court.

II.
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY HELD THAT
THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT THE PROPER
PARTY IN INTEREST AND THAT
THERE WAS AN INVALID ASSIGNMENT
As previously outlined above, when the facts are viewed in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiff it is clear from the actions of the Plaintiff and LeRoy
Townsend that they intended that there be a valid oral assignment. The Defendants
allege that even if there was a valid assignment it was from Mr. Townsend in his
personal capacity and not from Mr. Townsend in his capacity of trustee of the
Townsend Trust.
The Defendants further claim that the Plaintiff is barred from alleging
that there was a valid assignment from the trust since this issue has not been
previously addressed. However, at the hearing on this matter, Plaintiffs counsel
specifically argued to the trial judge that there was a valid assignment and one can
logically infer that if there is a valid assignment it must be from the proper party in
interest. [Transcript of December 7, 1998 hearing at p.20, Ins 15-17]. Judge Stott
required that Plaintiffs counsel only argue from the Affidavits of Plaintiff and LeRoy
Townsend and specifically requested that Plaintiffs counsel show the court where
the Affidavits stated there was a verbal assignment prior to the filing of the action.
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[Transcript of December 7, 1998 hearing, at p. 20, Ins 19-20]. When a continuance
was requested so that more of the facts surrounding the verbal assignment could be
ascertained, the trial court improperly denied the request.
In addition, the Defendants argue that the Pride Exploration at 798
F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1986), case in the Plaintiffs brief is not applicable to this matter.
[Appellee's Brief at 11]. As previously argued, assignments may be either oral or
written and no special form is required to effectuate an assignment. In addition, as
cited in Plaintiffs brief, assignments are construed in accordance with the general
contract principles. [Appellant's Brief at p. 18]. See Matter of Estate of Vaughn, 588
P.2dc 1295 (Or. App., 1979) and Horbal v. Moxharn Nat. Bank, 697 A.2d 577 (Pa
1977).

The ruling in Pride Exploration holds that it is not necessary for the grantor

to specifically indicate the capacity in which he is conveying an interest if the whole
of the document clearly indicates the grantor and grantee. Following this logic, the
terms of a verbal assignment are valid if it is clear from the circumstances
surrounding the assignment that a cause of action owned by a trust is transferred by
an individual who is the trustee of the trust even though a specific reference is not
made by the trustee that he is doing it in his capacity as trustee.
In this matter, it is clear that Mr. Townsend, as trustee, assigned the
right to this action to Plaintiff. This assignment is valid even though it may not have
been clear from the facts alleged in the Affidavits that he was doing it in his capacity
as trustee. The Trust in this matter correctly assigned its rights to the Plaintiff and
the Plaintiff is the proper party in interest. In the alternative, the Court should have
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allowed for the requested evidentiary hearing so that the parties who were in privity
to the verbal assignment could testify as the facts surrounding the assignment.

III.
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THIS ACTION
HAS RESULTED IN UNJUST ENRICHMENT TO THE
DEFENDANTS; CONSEQUENTLY, EQUITY REQUIRES THAT
THE VERBAL ASSIGNMENT UPHELD
As argued by the Plaintiff in the Memorandum in Support of Summary
Judgment [R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at p. 15] and
at the hearing held on this matter [Transcript of December 7, 1998 hearing at p.7, In
2], the Defendants have been unjustly enriched. They have failed to provide the
court or even to the Plaintiff an accounting as to $250,000.00 provided to them by
LeRoy Townsend. [R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at p.
6], They only argue that the Plaintiff is not the party in interest and that this action
should be dismissed. However, due to the statute of limitations in this matter, the
effect of the trial courts dismissal is to bar further action against the Defendants.
Additionally, the record establishes that the Defendants are currently involved in the
aloe business and yet they deny without providing any evidence to the contrary that
the funds provided by Mr. Townsend have not been used in their current ventures.
[R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at p. 11 ].
The Utah Supreme Court held in American Towers Owners Ass'n, Inc.
v. CCI Mechanical. Inc.. 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996) as follows:
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Before unjust enrichment may serve as a basis of recovery, there must
be a benefit conferred on one person by another; appreciation or
knowledge by conferee of benefit; and acceptance or retention by
conferee of benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable
for conferee to retain benefit without payment of value.
The facts as established in Plaintiffs brief clearly demonstrate that the
above referenced elements of unjust enrichment are present. The Defendant's
received $250,000.00 from LeRoy Townsend, an 82 year man, so that they could
establish an aloe vera business and that the only thing received by Mr. Townsend
was a stock certificate in a defunct company that had been purchased for $5,000.00
and was never revived by Lee Ritter. However, Lee Ritter owns an aloe vera farm
and continue to do business in the aloe vera market.

[R. at 361; Memorandum in

Support of Summary Judgment at p. 14].
Unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine and as argued in Plaintiff's
brief, an assignment can nonetheless be held valid even though the assignment may
not be perfect at law. [Appellant's Brief at 16-17].
"A right to recovery under the doctrine of unjust enrichment is
essentially equitable, its basis being that in a given situation it is
contrary to equity and good conscience for one person to retain a
benefit which has come to him at the expense of another. 66 Am Jur.
2d Restitution and Implied Contracts §3 (1963).
Equity requires that the trial court's dismissal in this action be
overturned and that Defendants be required to the relief demanded in the Complaint.
In the alternative, the Plaintiff should be entitled to introduce evidence as to the
verbal assignment. To affirm the trial court's dismissal amounts to legalized theft by
the Defendants.
6

IV.
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED
THE PLAINTIFF'S CONTINUANCE
AND/OR SHOULD HAVE PROVIDED
FOR AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT
PRIOR TO DISMISSAL
In this action, the trial court took a very drastic measure and dismissed
the Plaintiffs cause of action. This harsh ruling effectively bars either the Plaintiff or
Mr. LeRoy Townsend from ever being able to bring suit against the Defendants for
the recovery of the $250,000.00 paid to the Lee Ritter. Judge Stott should have
provided for amendment to complaint prior to dismissal or allowed the Plaintiff a
continuance rather than improperly dismissing this action.
The Defendants argue in their brief that the Plaintiff should not be
entitled to amend his complaint. In particular they cite Estate of Martin Haro v. Maria
Guadalupe Haro, 887 P.2d 878 (C. App Utah) which holds that the Plaintiff lacked
the capacity to sue and consequently the original suit was a nullity and could not
later be amended to substitute the correct parties.
However, the facts in this action differ from the facts in the Estate of
Martin Maro. In this matter, the Plaintiff has the capacity to sue by way of his verbal
assignment and therefore amendment should be allowed before the drastic remedy
of dismissal allowed.

The Plaintiff specifically requested an amendment to the

pleadings as provided in Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [R. at 361;
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at p. 29]. In addition, the request to
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amend pleadings was requested at the hearing on this matter. [Transcript of
December 7, 1998 hearing, at p. 9, Ins 20-21]. Furthermore, as provided in Rule
17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Plaintiff properly objected to the
dismissal of the action and should be allowed to amend his pleadings. In the
alternative, due to the extreme effect of the dismissal, the trial court at a minimum
should have allowed for the requested continuance so that an evidentiary hearing
could be held in this matter to determine the facts of the verbal assignment.

CONCLUSION

This matter is before the Court from a grant of Defendant's motion to
dismiss. From the facts in this matter, it is evident that the Trial Court failed to
consider the evidence in a light most reasonable to the Plaintiff before it dismissed
this action. The court ignored the facts demonstrating that there was a valid
assignment and that the Plaintiff is the proper party in interest. In addition, the Trial
Court improperly denied the Plaintiffs motion for amendment and continuance. The
courts improper actions prevent the Plaintiff from providing additional evidence to
the Court as to the facts surrounding the verbal assignment.
It is well established that the Defendants have been unjustly enriched
since they now own a successful aloe vera business yet they have no legal
obligation to repay the monies or provide an accounting as to where the monies
were spent.

Equity requires that the Plaintiff be awarded the relief demanded in his

Complaint.
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This matter should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to
overturn Defendant's dismissal and provide for either entry of Summary Judgment in
favor Plaintiff, further evidentiary hearing or an amendment to com/tfaint.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED^/1p th day of Nov^mher*

HANSEN
^oYjnsel fir Plaintiff/Appellant
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